A World on Edge

In October 1945, representatives of fifty nations gathered in San Francisco to draft a new covenant for the world. On that cold day eighty years ago, those leaders signed the Charter of the United Nations, vowing to “save succeeding generations from the scourge of war.”ⁱ The memory of two world wars, separated by barely two decades, haunted the signatories. But hope abounded in the conviction that humanity had the capacity to design institutions strong enough to avert the next one. Sovereign equality, collective security, and the rejection of aggression were enshrined as global norms. The UN’s founding purpose was not utopian but deeply pragmatic: to construct an institutional framework that might contain the impulses of great power rivalry, prevent aggression, and provide a platform for dialogue before conflict spiraled into global catastrophe.

Eighty years later, the world again lives under the shadow of great-power conflict. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022 shattered the post–Cold War assumption that Europe’s borders were stable. China’s assertiveness in the South China Sea and its threats toward Taiwan further strain the very architecture designed to prevent conflict. Commentators openly discuss the possibility of a third world war. In this climate of anxiety, the question presses: has the United Nations retained the capacity to fulfill the mission that inspired its birth, or has it become an institution dangerously out of step with the realities of the 21st century?

This question is not new. Three decades ago, in his 1993 book Reforming the United Nations: The Challenge of Relevance, K.P. Saksena identified the UN’s growing structural and political problems.ⁱⁱ The Cold War had ended, and the UN seemed poised to take on new responsibilities. Yet Saksena warned that without deep reform, the organization risked irrelevance. Today, the issues he catalogued remain, and new challenges have emerged. As the UN concludes its 80th General Assembly, reform is not merely a matter of efficiency; it is a matter of survival at the moment when the world most requires this community of nations.

Enduring Problems of Security Council Paralysis

One of the principle founding structures of the United Nations is the Security Council, with its five permanent members: the United States, Soviet Union (now Russia), United Kingdom, France, and China. The Security Council was designed as the fulcrum of the postwar order, tasked with maintaining international peace and security. But its architecture, especially the veto power of the five permanent members (P5), has repeatedly paralyzed collective action. During the Cold War, the U.S. and Soviet Union blocked each other. In the post-Cold War period, optimism briefly bloomed when the Council authorized interventions in Iraq (1991), Somalia (1992), and the Balkans. Yet by the late 1990s, divisions had reemerged, and by the 2000s, paralysis had again become the norm.

Russia’s vetoes since 2014, particularly on resolutions concerning Ukraine and Syria, have rendered the Council unable to act against unambiguous violations of the Charter’s central principle: the territorial integrity of states.ⁱⁱⁱ China has likewise wielded its veto and influence to shield allies such as Myanmar from censure and to water down sanctions on North Korea.^iv The Council’s dysfunction is no longer episodic, rather it is systemic. If an aggressor state can commit blatant breaches of international law while enjoying the protection of a single P5 ally, the Council fails in its foundational mission.

Saksena anticipated this problem in 1993, arguing that unchecked veto powers undermined both legitimacy and effectiveness. Calls for reform, such as limiting the veto in cases of mass atrocities and increasing transparency in Council proceedings have gained traction among member states and civil society.^{v vi} Efforts to expand permanent membership to include India, Brazil, Nigeria, South Africa, or a Latin American seat have been discussed for decades. Yet the P5, predictably, resist changes that would constrain their authority. Reform requires amending the Charter, a process that demands two-thirds approval of the General Assembly and ratification by all P5. In practice, this grants each of the permanent members veto power over changes to their own status. The result is stalemate. Without creative solutions, the Council risks becoming a theater for geopolitical point-scoring rather than a guardian of peace.

The Question of Sovereignty and Norm Violation

The UN Charter enshrines sovereignty as its cornerstone. Yet Russia’s invasion of Ukraine represents the most brazen violation of this principle since Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990. Unlike that earlier episode, the Council is unable to mount a unified response. China, for its part, advances territorial claims in the South China Sea despite a binding arbitral tribunal ruling against it in 2016.^vii

Such violations not only destabilize regions but also erode the credibility of the UN system itself. If the UN’s founding principle of sovereignty is treated as negotiable, what remains of the post-1945 order? The UN must find ways to reassert international norms even when the Council is blocked. This could involve strengthening the role of the General Assembly under the “Uniting for Peace” precedent, which allows the Assembly to recommend collective action when the Council is deadlocked.^viii It may also require new mechanisms to hold violators accountable through international courts or coalitions of willing states operating with UN endorsement.

Financial Strains and Institutional Fragility

If the Security Council crisis is political, the budget crisis is existential. The UN’s work depends on timely contributions from member states, yet non-payment is chronic. The United States, traditionally the largest contributor covering 22 percent of the regular budget and 27 percent of peacekeeping, has begun reducing funding and has suspended payments to agencies such as UNESCO.^ix Other major powers including China and Russia, have increasingly delayed their payments for political leverage, while smaller states struggle to meet obligations. This results in liquidity crises, forcing the UN Secretariat to impose hiring freezes, delay reimbursements to peacekeeping contributors, and cut operational capacity. ^x

As of mid-2025, over ninety countries have failed to make payments. The result is a liquidity crisis forcing the Secretariat to cut up to twenty percent of staff, nearly seven thousand jobs. Humanitarian agencies like OCHA are scaling back at precisely the moment global needs are greatest. 

Proposals have surfaced to redistribute UN offices away from high-cost hubs like Geneva and Vienna to more affordable locations in Asia, Africa, or Latin America. Even the notion of moving parts of the Secretariat out of New York is now on the table. Such moves could reduce costs while also symbolically rebalancing the geographic center of gravity. Yet entrenched bureaucratic and political resistance has slowed progress.

If financial instability persists, the UN risks a vicious cycle: reduced capacity undermines performance, which fuels skepticism about relevance, which in turn justifies further funding cuts. Breaking this cycle requires both diversification of funding sources and greater efficiency in resource allocation.

Anticipating U.S. Retrenchment

Perhaps the most destabilizing variable is the trajectory of U.S. leadership. The UN has always been shaped by U.S. engagement. Washington was the institution’s architect, its largest financial backer, and often its political leader. When the United States invests in the UN, the organization can act decisively, as seen in the Korean War or the Gulf War. When it withdraws, paralysis spreads.

The possibility of deeper U.S. retrenchment, whether due to domestic politics or fiscal constraints, raises profound questions about the UN’s future. Regional organizations and ad hoc coalitions might substitute for UN action, while the universal legitimacy of the Charter could be lost. Alternatively, other powers could fill the vacuum within the community of states. China has already sought to increase its influence, both through financial contributions and by placing nationals in senior UN posts. In a weakened or multipolar UN, with greater influence from Beijing and Moscow, priorities would shift away from liberal democratic values toward state-centric sovereignty, diminishing the West’s ability to shape global norms.

For U.S. policymakers, this is not simply a question of altruism. A weakened UN would leave Washington with fewer multilateral tools to address crises, from pandemics to nuclear proliferation. If the U.S. vacates leadership, others will set the rules, and not in ways aligned with American interests.

Paths Toward Renewal

What reforms might restore the UN’s relevance in the face of these challenges? Several avenues deserve consideration:

1. Security Council Reform: Expand permanent and rotating membership to better reflect today’s geopolitical landscape, particularly by including states from Africa, Latin America, and South Asia. Establish voluntary restraint on veto use in cases of mass atrocity, as championed by the ACT group and the French-Mexican initiative.^{xi xii}
2. Empowering the General Assembly: Strengthen the Assembly’s role when the Council is deadlocked, using the “Uniting for Peace” precedent as a legal foundation. This could restore at least a measure of collective legitimacy when the P5 are divided.^xiii
3. Financial Innovation: Broaden funding sources by introducing modest global levies (on airline tickets, carbon emissions, or digital transactions) earmarked for UN operations. Encourage decentralization of operations to lower-cost regions, simultaneously reducing expenses and increasing equity.^xiv
4. Revitalizing Peacekeeping: Invest in rapid-deployment capabilities and partnerships with regional organizations such as the African Union. Peacekeeping remains one of the UN’s most visible successes but requires modernization to handle hybrid conflicts, cyber threats, and disinformation campaigns.
5. Protecting Norms: Develop new accountability tools for sovereignty violations, including enhanced roles for the International Criminal Court and regional tribunals. Strengthen links between the UN and civil society networks that can document and publicize violations even when states remain silent.

Conclusion: Relevance or Ruin

The United Nations was born from catastrophe, forged in the ashes of world war as a safeguard against humanity’s darkest impulses. Its failures are real, but so too are its achievements, from decolonization, the development of international law, the eradication of smallpox, and the prevention of nuclear war despite decades of rivalry. To dismiss the UN as obsolete is to forget these successes and to underestimate the dangers of a world without even a flawed forum for dialogue.

As the UN marks its 80th General Assembly, the stakes are existential. Reform is not a luxury; it is a necessity. The world of 2025 faces cascading crises, from climate change to cyber conflict to great-power rivalry that no state can solve alone. The UN’s relevance will not be determined exclusively in New York or Geneva. It will be determined by whether the community of states can summon the will to reform an institution that remains humanity’s best hope of avoiding a third world war. A reformed UN, updated for the 21st century, is necessary to prevent the horrors its founders knew too well. The alternative is not stasis but irrelevance, and irrelevance in the face of looming catastrophe could mean ruin.

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^{i United Nations, “Charter of the United Nations,” 1945, https://www.un.org/en/about-us/un-charter
ii K.P. Saksena, Reforming the United Nations: The Challenge of Relevance (New Delhi: Sage Publications, 1993)
iii United Nations Security Council, “Voting Data on the Situation in Ukraine,” UN.org, https://digitallibrary.un.org/
iv United Nations, “Security Council Veto List,” Dag Hammarskjöld Library, https://research.un.org/en/docs/sc/quick
v France-Mexico Joint Initiative on Veto Restraint, “Political Declaration on Suspension of Veto Powers in Cases of Mass Atrocities,” Ministry of Europe and Foreign Affairs, https://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/
vi ACT Group, “Code of Conduct Regarding Security Council Action Against Genocide, Crimes Against Humanity, or War Crimes,” https://www.globalr2p.org/resources/
vii International Court of Justice, “South China Sea Arbitration (Philippines v. China),” PCA Case No. 2013-19, https://pca-cpa.org/en/cases/7/
viii United Nations, “Uniting for Peace Resolution,” A/RES/377(V), November 3, 1950, https://undocs.org/A/RES/377(V)
ix UNESCO, “U.S. Withdrawal from UNESCO,” UNESCO.org, https://www.unesco.org/en/articles/united-states-withdraws-unesco
x United Nations, “Financial Situation of the United Nations,” Report of the Secretary-General, 2024, https://www.un.org/en/ga/fifth/financial/
xi France-Mexico Joint Initiative on Veto Restraint, “Political Declaration on Suspension of Veto Powers in Cases of Mass Atrocities,” Ministry of Europe and Foreign Affairs, https://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/
xii ACT Group, “Code of Conduct Regarding Security Council Action Against Genocide, Crimes Against Humanity, or War Crimes,” https://www.globalr2p.org/resources/
xiii United Nations, “Uniting for Peace Resolution,” A/RES/377(V), November 3, 1950, https://undocs.org/A/RES/377(V)
xiv United Nations, “Financial Situation of the United Nations,” Report of the Secretary-General, 2024, https://www.un.org/en/ga/fifth/financial/}