In February 2023, CIA Director William Burns revealed that, according to U.S. intelligence, Xi Jinping had ordered the Chinese military to be ready to invade Taiwan by 2027.ⁱ Since then, China’s coercion has shifted from sporadic brinkmanship to a steady campaign of naval maneuvers and near-daily air incursions into Taiwan’s air defense zone.^{ii iii iv} Beijing has also armed its legal toolkit: new China Coast Guard rules, effective June 2024, authorize detention of “trespassers” in disputed waters—an escalation condemned by regional governments and flagged by U.S. Indo-Pacific Command lawyers as enabling detention of foreign vessels and crews.^v Strategically, Xi continues to declare “reunification” inevitable, rhetoric reinforced in official messaging.^vi Senior U.S. commanders, including Admirals Phil Davidson and John Aquilino, have warned that the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) preparations align with the 2027 window.^{vii viii ix x} Whether seen as a deadline or a planning horizon, the consensus is clear: the risk of war over Taiwan is rising.^xi

Saving Taiwan’s Semiconductor Lifeline

Why Washington Needs a Contingency Plan for the World’s Most Critical Industry

As the rules-based international order continues to erode with Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the prospect of a Chinese invasion of Taiwan should be sobering to Western allied countries. Taiwan is the beating heart of global semiconductor manufacturing, and historian Chris Miller argues in Chip War that the fight for semiconductor dominance is the defining economic and geopolitical struggle of our time.^xii As Miller notes, “controlling advanced chips is like controlling oil in the 20th century—but far more concentrated.”^xiii While this is firmly understood by policymakers and strategists, what is less frequently acknowledged is that Taiwan’s extraordinary concentration of technical expertise—its engineers, designers, and chipmakers—may prove as strategically decisive as the silicon itself. If China were to launch a blockade or invasion of Taiwan, the world would not only face a supply chain crisis but also the possible loss of the singular human capital that powers advanced chip production.

The United States and its allies must prepare for this scenario now. A credible contingency plan to protect and, if necessary, relocate key Taiwanese semiconductor talent would ensure that the free world retains access to cutting-edge manufacturing capabilities even under conditions of war. Such a plan would not replace Taiwan’s central role in the global economy, nor should it undermine Taipei’s own sovereignty. Rather, it would function as a security guarantee of last resort—an emergency insurance policy to safeguard the talent underpinning the world’s most important industry.

This proposal may sound extraordinary, but history provides precedent: as the Cold War unfolded following the end of WWII, the United States conducted Operation Paperclip, a secret intelligence program in which more than 1,600 German scientists, engineers, and technicians were taken from former Nazi Germany to prevent their extradition to an increasingly hostile Soviet Union. The operation was not about abandoning Germany; it was about preserving its people and capabilities while denying Moscow leverage.^xiv A semiconductor talent contingency plan aimed not at rocket scientists but at semiconductor engineers would function in a similar spirit—protecting a free people and their irreplaceable skills from coercion.

Taiwan’s Central Role in the Semiconductor Supply Chain

The strength of Taiwan’s leadership in semiconductors lies principally in the Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC) which produces more than 90 percent of the world’s most advanced chips below 5-nanometers in size, and is the sole foundry capable of producing chips at the 2-nanometer scale and below.^xv These semiconductors power everything from smartphones and data centers to advanced weapons systems and the most sophisticated models of artificial intelligence. Among them are NVIDIA’s A100 and H100 chips—manufactured by TSMC—which form the backbone of generative AI systems developed by OpenAI, Anthropic, Meta, and other leading firms. The depth of Taiwan’s specialization is staggering: no other country combines comparable technical expertise, institutional knowledge, and production capacity.

This dominance rests not only on TSMC’s operational infrastructure but on the dense networks of engineers and managers who make it function. Their tacit knowledge—much of it undocumented and built through decades of collective experience—cannot be easily replicated. While the United States, Japan, and the European Union are investing heavily in semiconductor fabrication plants, those facilities will still depend on human capital drawn from Taiwan.

China understands this dependence. Senior Chinese officials have made no secret of their ambition to dominate global semiconductors, and Beijing has devoted billions to its domestic industry.^xvi Yet despite massive subsidies, China remains unable to match the performance of Taiwanese firms in the most advanced processes. This gap underscores why Taiwan’s engineers, not only its fabs, are the decisive bottleneck in global chipmaking.

The Strategic Risk to Global Security

If China’s 2027 timeline for invading Taiwan materializes, the risk to semiconductor supply would be immediate. An invasion or blockade could halt exports from Taiwan almost overnight, crippling industries worldwide. But the more enduring danger would be the potential capture, coercion, or even displacement of Taiwan’s skilled workforce. Engineers and scientists may face immense pressure to serve Beijing’s interests. At the very least, China would gain bargaining power over global technology supply chains by holding this human capital hostage.

The implications Taiwan’s semiconductor lifeline falling under Chinese control extend far beyond consumer electronics. Advanced semiconductors are the foundation of artificial intelligence, quantum computing, and next-generation defense systems. A disruption in Taiwan could cripple the training of large AI models, stall global research, and erode military readiness. In an era where AI is becoming a strategic resource on par with oil or nuclear power, the risk of losing access to advanced chips is profound.^xvii

If China were to seize Taiwan’s semiconductor industry, it could accelerate its own military AI development while slowing that of the United States and its allies. This would tilt the global balance of power in ways difficult to reverse. The competition for talent is not merely economic—it is geopolitical. By protecting Taiwan’s engineers, Washington would also be protecting the future of democratic leadership in advanced technologies.

For Washington and its allies, simply securing hardware or building fabs is not enough. Chips can be redesigned, and fabs can eventually be rebuilt, but the human knowledge embedded in Taiwan’s semiconductor workforce is far harder to replicate. Without a strategic plan to safeguard this talent, the world remains vulnerable to catastrophic disruption.

A Contingency Plan for Semiconductor Talent

What would such a plan entail? First, the United States should establish a multi-agency task force spanning the Departments of State, Commerce, Defense, and Homeland Security—alongside the intelligence community to lay the groundwork for extraction protocols, visa frameworks, housing, and research transition pathways. Through this task force, the United States and its allies should discreetly identify and map the critical segments of Taiwan’s semiconductor workforce—engineers, designers, process specialists, and managers essential to advanced-node production, particularly those working in advanced lithography.

Second, Washington should work with Taipei to design voluntary evacuation and resettlement options that could be activated if Taiwan faced imminent invasion or blockade. Such measures would not be framed as “extraction” or “flight,” but rather as protective contingencies—akin to how governments maintain evacuation plans for their citizens abroad. Participation would remain voluntary, reinforcing respect for Taiwan’s sovereignty.

Third, the receiving infrastructure must be prepared in advance. The United States, Japan, South Korea, and trusted European allies could establish “talent safe havens”: research campuses and industrial parks ready to host evacuated engineers and their families. One resettlement option could be the TSMC Arizona facility, currently under expansion through the CHIPS Act. While the plant is not yet capable of 2nm production, its future phases could be accelerated, upgraded, and staffed with relocated talent.

Additional options include secured lab environments at Sandia, Oak Ridge, or DARPA-affiliated research centers. These sites would need both the technical infrastructure and the social support—housing, education, healthcare—to make relocation viable. Crucially, Taiwanese professionals should be integrated as leaders, not merely workers, ensuring continuity of their expertise and dignity.

Finally, financing mechanisms must be prearranged. Public-private partnerships could provide stipends and contracts to ensure stability for relocated talent. Multilateral funds—perhaps modeled on NATO burden-sharing—would spread costs and signal allied unity. The private sector, especially firms reliant on advanced chips, would have strong incentives to contribute.

Lessons From History: Operation Paperclip

The comparison to Operation Paperclip is instructive, as today’s competition with China echoes the dynamics of the early Cold War. As tensions with the Soviets escalated following WWII, the United States feared that USSR would use German scientists to develop weapons. To prevent this, the United States launched Operation Paperclip, recruiting German scientists for its own space and defense programs while denying their expertise to Moscow. Just as America feared, the Soviet Union launched Operation Osoaviakhim, forcibly relocating thousands of German rocket scientists and engineers to the USSR.^xviii Building on earlier wartime recruitment efforts, Moscow aimed to transfer entire research and production centers such as Hitler’s V-2 rocket program into Soviet hands.^xix These rival efforts fueled the Space Race and ultimately laid the foundation for NASA’s global leadership.

Today, the United States faces a similar contest with China over emerging technologies such as artificial intelligence, where control of semiconductor talent will be decisive. Just as Operation Paperclip reflected both technical ingenuity and political resolve, a contingency plan for Taiwan’s semiconductor industry would carry the same dual message: that the West will safeguard free peoples and critical knowledge even under dire circumstances. Such a plan would not signal abandonment of Taiwan but rather reaffirm that the free world is prepared to defend Taiwan’s people and capabilities in the face of aggression. By planning ahead, Washington would strengthen deterrence and signal to Beijing that coercion will not yield strategic advantage.

Building Allied Consensus

The United States cannot act alone. Any plan must be multilateral, involving key semiconductor powers and democratic partners. Japan and South Korea have deep semiconductor industries and could host relocated talent. The European Union, with its push for digital sovereignty, has strong incentives to participate. Australia, Canada, and other allies could contribute logistical and financial support.

Coordination would also reduce the risk of political backlash. A plan undertaken solely by Washington might appear hegemonic. A plan organized through a coalition of democracies, by contrast, would underscore shared stakes and distribute both burdens and benefits.

Conclusion

The world has entered an era in which semiconductors are the strategic resource of the twenty-first century. Just as oil shaped geopolitics in the twentieth century, chips will define the balance of power in the decades ahead. Taiwan sits at the epicenter of this competition—not only as a location, but as a community of people whose skills are unmatched.

Failing to plan for the protection of this human capital would be a grave strategic oversight. Proposals such as an updated Operation Paperclip for semiconductors have been made in the past, including an op-ed in AEI and RealClearPolicy from 2022,^{xx xxi} and this author’s policy memo for the Lincoln Network in 2021.^xxii Now is the time for action. Washington and its allies should immediately prepare a semiconductor talent contingency plan, before a crisis unfolds. Such preparation does not undermine deterrence; it strengthens it. It does not abandon Taiwan; it affirms commitment to its people.

Between 1945 and 1959, Operation Paperclip showed that democratic nations could rally extraordinary resources to protect free peoples under siege. In the years ahead, the United States and its allies may need to show similar resolve. By preparing today to safeguard Taiwan’s semiconductor lifeline, they can ensure that the world’s most critical industry remains a source of strength for democracy, not a lever of coercion for authoritarianism.

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^{i Olivia Gazis. “CIA Director William Burns: ‘I Wouldn’t Underestimate’ Xi’s Ambitions for Taiwan.” CBS News, February 3, 2023.
ii Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative. “Shifting Tactics at Second Thomas Shoal.” Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative (AMTI), Center for Strategic and International Studies, August 22, 2024. https://amti.csis.org/shifting-tactics-at-second-thomas-shoal
iii Avril Haines, “Annual Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community,” Office of the Director of National Intelligence, March 2023.
iv Chris Buckley and Amy Qin, “China Sends Record Number of Military Aircraft Near Taiwan,” New York Times, December 2022.
v U.S. Indo-Pacific Command. TACAID – CCG Regulation 3 (Final), Ver. 2. J06, Legal Office, U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, March 2024. https://www.pacom.mil/Portals/55/Documents/Legal/J06 TACAID - CCG Regulation 3 %28FINAL%29 - VER 2.pdf
vi Dzirhan Mahadzir. “Xi Jinping Pledges Reunification with Taiwan in New Year’s Message” USNI News, January 1, 2024. https://news.usni.org/2024/01/01/xi-jinping-pledges-reunification-with-taiwan-in-new-years-message
vii Mallory Shelbourne. “Davidson: China Could Try to Take Control of Taiwan In ‘Next Six Years’” USNI News, March 9, 2024. https://news.usni.org/2021/03/09/davidson-china-could-try-to-take-control-of-taiwan-in-next-six-years
viii Martina, Michael, and David Brunnstrom. “CIA Chief Warns against Underestimating Xi’s Ambitions toward Taiwan.” Reuters, February 3, 2023. https://www.reuters.com/world/cia-chief-says-chinas-xi-little-sobered-by-ukraine-war-2023-02-02/
ix Associated Press. “CIA Chief: China Has Some Doubt on Ability to Invade Taiwan.” AP News, February 26, 2024. https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-taiwan-politics-united-states-government-eaf869eb617c6c356b2708607ed15759    
x Aquilino, Admiral John C. “Statement of Admiral John C. Aquilino, U.S. Navy, Commander, U.S. Indo-Pacific Command: U.S. Indo-Pacific Command Posture, 21 March 2024.” Testimony, Senate Armed Services Committee, March 21, 2024. https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/aquilino_statement.pdf
xi Robertson, Noah. “How DC Became Obsessed with a Potential 2027 Chinese Invasion of Taiwan.” Defense News, May 7, 2024. https://www.defensenews.com/pentagon/2024/05/07/how-dc-became-obsessed-with-a-potential-2027-chinese-invasion-of- taiwan/
xii Chris Miller, Chip War: The Fight for the World’s Most Critical Technology (New York: Scribner, 2022)
xiii Chris Miller, Chip War: The Fight for the World’s Most Critical Technology (New York: Scribner, 2022)
xiv Lasby, Clarence G. (1975). Project paperclip: German scientists and the Cold War. New York/N.Y: Atheneum (published 1971)
xv “How TSMC Builds a Chip,” TSMC Annual Report (2023).
xvi Lingling Wei and Keith Zhai, “China’s Chip Dreams Die Hard Despite U.S. Restrictions,” Wall Street Journal, March 2023.
xvii National Security Commission on Artificial Intelligence, Final Report (March 2021).
xviii Uhl, Matthias: Stalin’s V-2 (Germany: Bernard & Graefe Verlag, 2001)
xix Central Intelligence Group intelligence report, Summary of Operation Osoaviakhim, CIA-RDP82-00457R000200570007-4 (January 13, 1947)
xx Ben Noon & Allison Schwartz. “An Operation Paperclip for Taiwan” AEI, July 18, 2022 https://www.aei.org/op-eds/an- operation-paperclip-for-taiwan/
xxi Ben Noon & Allison Schwartz. “An Operation Paperclip for Taiwan” RealClearPolicy, July 18, 2022 https://www.realclearpolicy.com/articles/2022/07/18/an_operation_paperclip_for_taiwan_842956.html
xxii Richards, Josh. “Operation Paperclip 2.0” Lincoln Network (now the Foundation for American Innovation), November 24, 2021}